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#### Immigration reform will pass because the GOP is fractured --- pc is key and Obama is pushing.

McMorris-Santoro 10/15

Evan, BuzzFeed Staff, Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next, 10/15/13, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for

As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win.¶ The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer.¶ “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.”¶ The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Polls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

#### The plan re-unifies the GOP and wrecks Obama’s momentum --- best link card yet.

LeoGrande 12

William, School of Public Affairs @ American University, Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations?, 2012, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations¶ played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a¶ consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team¶ got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before¶ changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the¶ 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to¶ keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more¶ closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had¶ promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations¶ Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals.¶ At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to¶ improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the¶ bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the¶ Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC,¶ Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin¶ America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so¶ fraught with political danger. ¶ When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba,¶ which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement¶ for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel¶ regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43¶ The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late¶ Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to¶ Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him¶ dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44¶ With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the¶ Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second¶ term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four¶ years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify¶ congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other¶ Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such¶ hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again.¶ The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give¶ in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances.¶ Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the¶ Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba,¶ and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy¶ promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary¶ is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of¶ Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But¶ even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a¶ major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes¶ that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the¶ problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### We have a moral obligation to support comprehensive reform –solves exploitation and takes a stand against unethical practices Noorani 10 (Ali, Executive Director of the Reform Immigration FOR America campaign and National Immigration Forum, Why We Must Continue Pushing for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, <http://immigration.change.org/blog/view/why_we_must_continue_pushing_for_comprehensive_immigration_reform>) There are 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States today. And there are 279 Congressional votes standing between those people and the American dream. The fight for those 279 votes that 11 million people need has been long and tough, but now, more than ever, is the time for our courage and leadership.  In April, Arizona enshrined racial profiling into law — and awakened millions to the current civil rights crisis the immigrant community is facing in our country. Arizona changed the game and brought the urgency of our fight to a fever pitch.  Since then, at least 18 states have considered legislation similar to the Arizona law. The lack of political courage from both the White House and members of Congress to tackle immigration reform has left a vacuum that states like Arizona are rushing to fill with their own measures — and these measures mostly focus only on enforcement with no thought given to families and workers.  Immigration is no longer a policy debate; it is a political battle with clear choices: Legalization or criminalization. Justice for all or racial profiling. Family unity or family separation.  We, as advocates, also have a clear choice. We can negotiate with ourselves and entice our opponents to the table by proposing piecemeal options. But, an effort to push anything short of a comprehensive overhaul of our broken system would both give our opponents a reprieve from working on a bi-partisan solution to one of our nation’s most pressing problems and give our allies the choice of checking off the “immigration” box on their to-do list without having fully addressed the issue.  Anything less than full legalization of the 11 million undocumented immigrants is unacceptable, and we should not demand anything less.  We have a moral obligation to push for real reform that brings justice to all of our communities. We won’t allow the inaction of Congress to force us into negotiating away our power. The courage of those 11 million people is our power. If we back off from organizing the entire community, we will fail to create — much less take advantage of — the opportunities that lie ahead.  The American public has shown that they are in favor of immigration reform with a pathway to legalization. Our communities have stood up and made their voices heard. Arizona has ignited the 21st century fight for civil rights.  Now is the time for our lawmakers to step up and stop putting politics above what is right and just.  We must continue increasing our pressure. There are no lack of options in front of the President and Congress to legalize the undocumented, keep families together and reform our immigration system in the interests of our nation. There is only a lack conviction. And it’s up to us, as immigration rights advocates, to force them to do the right thing, and bring real, comprehensive reform to all 11 million undocumented immigrants, leaving no one behind.

### 1nc procedural

#### The affirmative should defend the hypothetical implications of the implementation of their plan

#### Reasons to prefer

#### 1. stasis --- focus on the plan is necessary for stable link ground and to ensure the efficacy of our discussions --- absent stasis debate becomes two ships passing in the night.

#### 2. sandbagging --- allowing the affirmative to change or alter their advocacy after the 1ac causes late breaking debates and neutralizes the focal point of negative strategy.

#### 3. implementation focus --- Viewing ethics in isolation is irresponsible & complicit with the evil they criticize.

**Issac 02**.,( Jeffery C. Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington & Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life. PhD Yale University. From “Ends, Means, and Politics.” Dissent Magazine. Volume 49. Issue # 2. Available online @ subscribing institutions using Proquest. Herm

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacyand international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they arealsovague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility.The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand.In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goalsand to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### 1nc t

#### Interpretation and violation --- economic engagement requires trade promotion --- the plan is an economic inducement

**Celik, 11** – master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

#### C. Voting issue –

#### 1. limits – broad interpretations of engagement include anything that effects the economy, which means everything

#### 2. negative ground – trade promotion is vital for a stable mechanism for disad links and counterplan ground

### 1nc k - 4

#### The 1AC’s gesture of recognition toward Cuba leaves UNTOUCHED the basic structures of oppression — removing Cuba from the terror list re-inscribes and legitimizes the coloniality of power.

Nelson Maldonado-Torres, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, ‘8 [*Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity*, p. 148-50] //DDI13

It is not possible to understand fully the difference between Fanon's and Honneth's critical takes on Hegel without considering their divergent views on the human subject and on the subjective motivations behind the struggle for recognition. Honneth correctly argues that when Hegel articulated the notion of a struggle for recognition he was definitely leaving behind a tradition of social and political thought that went back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, according to which self-preservation played the primary motivating role in leading humans to form states, political bodies, and institutions. According to Hegel, conflicts among humans were not to be traced back to a motive of self-preservation, but, as Honneth describes them, to moral impulses-that is, to the recognition of one's identity and personality. What Hegel, however, continues to hold, in line with dominant trends of political theory in his time, and what Honneth does not examine in his critical reflections on Hegel, is the extent to which the "right of property" functions as the primary marker of self-identity and personality. As a result, the struggle for recognition becomes primarily a struggle to be recognized as a proprietor. Hegel inherits this idea from a liberal tradition that defined human fraternity in terms of the coexistence in a "civil society" of autonomous individuals with rights of property--Locke's felicitous definition. Consider that for the Hegel of the Jena writings what initiated the struggle between persons was "theft," which made it clear that a violation of property was viewed as a violation of the person. Honor could only be regained in a life-and-death struggle. What changes in the Phenomenology of Spirit is that the life-and-death struggle, now subsumed in the dialectics of Spirit, gives rise to two modes of consciousness: one is independent and for-itself, while the other is dependent and takes the form of an object or thing; the former is lord, the latter is bondsman. Property becomes now a more complex category since even subjects can collapse into the category of objects, things, and possessions. The slave works on the property of the master and objectifies himself in it, while the master enjoys the product of the slave's work--from here comes the Marxist theory of alienation, which Marx later applied to economics and came up with the notion of surplus value. We have seen all of this already. What I want to add now is that there is a presumption that the relation between the subject and property is basic. Freedom is the objectification of the subjectivity of the individual. The end result of this is that the freedom and equality of the subject tend to collapse frequently into the claim for freedom and equality in the process of coming to possess something. We are free to possess what we want and equal in our chances to get what we want." This gives a dangerous self-referential character to the politics of recognition that threatens coalition politics and that more often than not leads only to minimal structural changes at the political and economic levels. The problem with the politics of recognition is therefore not so much that it dissolves questions of redistribution into questions of recognition as some have argued." The problem, in contrast, resides in self-centered claims for redistribution. In other words, the danger is w hen the struggle for recognition is reduced to questions about the respect, freedom, and equality of subjects who aim to overturn the system of lordship and bondage by coming finally to possess something of their own and to be recognized as proprietors. This conception of the struggle for recognition is fated to leave untouched the basic structure of the oppressive system that creates pathological modes of recognition and to hinder the chances for the formation of what has been aptly called "a coalition politics of receptive generosity.” In contrast to conceptions of the struggle for recognition articulated in terms of cultural identity or in terms of claims for possession and access to goods, Fanon discovered in his exploration of the lived experience of the black that one of the main challenges confronted by blacks in a racial society is not only that they are not recognized as people who can possess things, but that they are not recognized as people who can give things. Demands to be able to give are, in this respect, more radical than demands for possession. The master, under pressure, can allow the slave to have "things," but he will not recognize that he needs what the slave has. For the master, whatever the slave touches decreases in quality and value. Thus, even ifhe enters into commerce with the slave, the master will devalue the extent of the slave's contributions. Fanon was well aware of this dimension of the system of lordship and bondage. It was always the Negro teacher, the Negro doctor; brittle as I was becoming, I shivered at the slightest pretext. I knew, for instance, that if the physician made a mistake it would be the end of him and of all those who came after him. What could one expect, after all, from a Negro physician? As long as everything went well, he was praised to the skies, but look out, no nonsense, under any conditions! The black physician can never be sure how close he is to disgrace. I tell you, I was walled in: No exception was made for my refined manners, or my knowledge of literature, or my understanding of the quantum theory. (BSWM 1l7). Fanon suggests here that while coming to possess things or gaining abilities may be a necessary condition of the process of achieving liberation, it is certainly not sufficient and it should not become in itself the telos or goal of the process. The problem is that the logic of lordship and bondage may very well continue after formal concessions of rights of property. The master still resists opening himself to the Other and entering into the logic of ordinary ethical intersubjective contact. But why is it that the master resists accepting the gift or recognizing the Other as someone who can give? The answer should be clear by now: it makes evident the incompleteness of the master. Lordship requires impenetrability, while giving necessitates openness and receptivity. Giving in this sense represents the paradigmatic transgressive act. If giving is so dangerous it is not so much because it puts the other in debt, but because in the colonial context it requires an original act of openness that the master fundamentally resists." The master can easily pay any debt; what he cannot do is to open himself and to be receptive to the gift of the slave. This transaction violates the very meaning and purpose of the logic of lordship and bondage.

#### Coloniality generates a permanent state of exception that is the root cause of the death ethics of war and underwrites a hellish existence where death, murder, war, rape, and racism are ordinary

Maldonado-Torres 8 [Nelson, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, p. 217-21]

Dussel, Quijano, and Wynter lead us to the understanding that what happened in the Americas was a transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war—which represented a sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian countries—into a more stable and long-standing reality of damnation, and that this epistemic and material shift occurred in the colony. Damnation, life in hell, is colonialism: a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very constitution of people and no longer solely or principally to their faith or belief. That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates in the Americas into the suspicion that the conquered people, and then non-European peoples in general, are constitutively inferior and that therefore they should assume a position of slavery and serfdom. Later on, this idea would be solidified with respect to the slavery of African peoples, achieving stability up to the present with the tragic reality of different forms of racism. Through this process, what looked like a "state of exception" in the colonies became the rule in the modern world. However, deviating from Giorgio Agamben's diagnosis, one must say that the colony--long before the concentration camp and the Nazi politics of extermination--served as the testing ground for the limits and possibilities of modernity, thereby revealing its darkest secrets." It is race, the coloniality of power, and its concomitant Eurocentrism (and not only national socialisms or forms of fascism) that allow the "state of exception" to continue to define ordinary relations in this, our so-called postmodern world. ¶ Race emerges within a permanent state of exception where forms of behavior that are legitimate in war become a natural part of the ordinary way of life. In that world, an otherwise extraordinary affair becomes the norm and living in it requires extraordinary effort." In the racial/ colonial world, the "hell" of war becomes a condition that defines the reality of racialized selves, which Fanon referred to as the damnes de la terre (condemned of the earth). The damne (condemned) is a subject who exists in a permanent "hell," and as such, this figure serves as the main referent or liminal other that guarantees the continued affirmation of modernity as a paradigm of war. The hell of the condemned is not defined by the alienation of colonized productive forces, but rather signals the dispensability of racialized subjects, that is, the idea that the world would be fundamentally better without them. The racialized subject is ultimately a dispensable source of value, and exploitation is conceived in this context as due torture, and not solely as the extraction of surplus value. Moreover, it is this very same conception that gives rise to the particular erotic dynamics that characterize the relation between the master and its slaves or racialized workers. The condemned, in short, inhabit a context in which the confrontation with death and murder is ordinary. Their "hell" is not simply "other people," as Sartre would have put it-at least at one point - but rather racist perceptions that are responsible for the suspension of ethical behavior toward peoples at the bottom of the color line. Through racial conceptions that became central to the modern self, modernity and coloniality produced a permanent state of war that racialized and colonized subjects cannot evade or escape. ¶ The modern function of race and the coloniality of power, I am suggesting here, can be understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war in colonialism." This non-ethics included the practices of eliminating and enslaving certain subjects-for example, indigenous and black-as part of the enterprise of colonization. From here one could as well refer to them as the death ethics of war. War, however, is not only about killing or enslaving; it also includes a particular treatment of sexuality and femininity: rape. Coloniality is an order of things that places people of color within the murderous and rapist view of a vigilant ego, and the primary targets of this rape are women. But men of color are also seen through these lenses and feminized, to become fundamentally penetrable subjects for the ego conquiro. Racialization functions through gender and sex, and the ego conquiro is thereby constitutively a phallic ego as well." Dussel. who presents this thesis of the phallic character of the ego cogito, also makes links, albeit indirectly, with the reality of war. ¶ And thus, in the beginning of modernity, before Descartes discovered ... a terrifying anthropological dualism in Europe, the Spanish conquistadors arrived in America. The phallic conception of the European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of the vanquished Indians. "Males," Bartolome de las Casas writes, are reduced through "the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom"; but this only occurs with those who have remained alive, because many of them have died; however, "in war typically they only leave alive young men (mozos) and women.""5 The indigenous people who survive the massacre or are left alive have to contend with a world that considers them to be dispensable. And since their bodies have been conceived of as inherently inferior or violent, they must be constantly subdued or civilized, which requires renewed acts of conquest and colonization. The survivors continue to live in a world defined by war, and this situation is peculiar in the case of women. As T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renee T. White put it in the preface to their anthology Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions: A sexist and/or racist patriarchal culture and order posts and attempts to maintain, through violent acts of force if necessary, the subjugation and inferiority of women of color. As Joy James notes, "its explicit, general premise constructs a conceptual framework of male [and/or white] as normative in order to enforce a politicaljracial, economic, cultural. sexual] and intellectual mandate of male [and/or white] as superior." The warfront has always been a "feminized" and "colored" space for women of color. Their experiences and perceptions of war, conflict, resistance, and struggle emerge from their specific racial-ethnic and gendered locations ... Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent," Walzer notes. Thus, this volume operates from the premise that war has been and is presently in our midst.” The links between war, conquest, and the exploitation of women's bodies are hardly accidental. In his study of war and gender, Joshua Goldstein argues that conquest usually proceeds through an extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime." He argues that to understand conquest, one needs to examine: I) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; 2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination; and 3) dependence on the exploitation of women's labor-including reproduction." My argument is, first, that these three elements came together in a powerful way in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest and colonization of the Americas. My second point is that through the idea of race, these elements exceed the activity of conquest and come to define what from that point on passes as the idea of a "normal" world. As a result, the phenomenology of a racial context resembles, if it is not fundamentally identical to, the phenomenology of war and conquest. Racism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects that, once vanquished, are said to be inherently servile and whose bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual abuse, exploitation, and control. The coloniality of power cannot be fully understood without reference to the transformation and naturalization of war and conquest in modern times. ¶ Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. "Killability" and "rapeability" are inscribed into the images of colonial bodies and deeply mark their ordinary existence. Lacking real authority, colonized men are permanently feminized and simultaneously represent a constant threat for whom any amount of authority, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria that knows no lirnits.?" Mythical depiction of the black man's penis is a case in point: the black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, particularly white women. The black woman, in turn, is seen as always already sexually available to the rapist gaze of the white, and as fundamentally promiscuous. In short, the black woman is seen as a highly erotic being whose primary function is fulfilling sexual desire and reproduction. To be sure, any amount of "penis" in either one represents a threat, but in his most familiar and typical forms the black man represents the act of rape- "raping" -while the black woman is seen as the most legitimate victim of rape- "being raped." In an antiblack world black women appear as subjects who deserve to be raped and to suffer the consequences-in terms of a lack of protection from the legal system, sexual abuse, and lack of financial assistance to sustain themselves and their families-just as black men deserve to be penalized for raping, even without having committed the act. Both "raping" and "being raped" are attached to blackness as if they form part of the essence of black folk, who are seen as a dispensable population. Black bodies are seen as excessively violent and erotic, as well as being the legitimate recipients of excessive violence, erotic and otherwise." "Killability" and "rapeability" are part of their essence, understood in a phenomenological way. The "essence" of blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part of a larger context of meaning in which the death ethics of war gradually becomes a constitutive part of an allegedly normal world. In its modern racial and colonial connotations and uses, blackness is the invention and the projection of a social body oriented by the death ethics of war." This murderous and raping social body projects the features that define it onto sub-Others in order to be able to legitimate the same behavior that is allegedly descriptive of them. The same ideas that inspire perverted acts in war--particularly slavery, murder, and rape--are legitimized in modernity through the idea of race and gradually come to be seen as more or less normal thanks to the alleged obviousness and non-problematic character of black slavery and anti-black racism. To be sure, those who suffer the consequences of such a system are primarily blacks and indigenous peoples, but it also deeply affects all of those who appear as colored or close to darkness. In short, this system of symbolic representations, the material conditions that in part produce and continue to legitimate it, and the existential dynamics that occur therein (which are also at the same time derivative and constitutive of such a context) are part of a process that naturalizes the non-ethics or death ethics of war. Sub-ontological difference is the result of such naturalization and is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world, ontology collapses into a Manicheanism, as Fanon suggested."

#### Vote negative to bring about “the end of the world” as we know it --- only by listening to the cry of the condemned and expressing a preferential option toward them through our critical intervention can we generate the nonsexist fraternity, affiliation, and ethic of love necessary to solve paradigms of war and spark a true humanity

Maldonado-Torres 8 [Nelson, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, p. 243-46]

That Hitler is Europe's demon points to Dussel’s idea regarding the proto-history of the ego cogito. Before Descartes and Hitler, there was Cortes. Before Cartesianism and Hitlerism, there was racial slavery and colonialism. A de-colonial reduction of Western thought brings out these connections and reveals hidden dimensions in European modernity: from Cesaire's link between Hitlerism and colonialism to Dussel's phenomenology of the ego conquiro, to Fanon’s explorations of the lived experience of the colonized, in respect to which he tested the limits of dominant ontological and psychoanalytical conceptions. The European Cartesian-inspired sciences give way here to de-colonial Cesaireian inspired sciences and forms of critique according to which the truth and the good are only found, if not instantiated, by the preferential option for the damnes, the suspicion of master morality, the epistemic priority of the color line, and the ethical suspension of identity and the telos of empire. Cartesianism introduces a highly abstract conception of subjectivity that renders embodiment unimportant or problematic for the task of knowledge; Hitlerism, in contrast, emphasizes embodiment to the point where it becomes an essence. Levinas posed the alternative of erotic and reproductive embodied subjectivity in response to Hitlerism and liberalism. Fanon proposed the idea of the body as the "open door of every consciousness" (BSWM T23), that is, as a site of hospitality and generous interhuman contact, as his response to the anthropology of colonialism and racism. Recognition of the body does not lead in this account to racial politics but rather to de-colonial engagement defined as the creation of the world of the You, which, in a racist and colonial order, demands no less than "the end of the world" -- from here the relevance of politics and revolutionary action to Fanon. The embodied self for Fanon is primarily a site of generous interaction. Agency is defined primordially in ethical terms. Fraternity in this context no longer refers to blood relations but rather to the primacy of intersubjective contact. Once the embodied self is recognized as the point of departure, and the body is conceived as the "open door" of consciousness, then nonsexist human fraternity does not take a secondary role to liberty or equality. The demands of a consistent struggle for nonsexist human fraternity, perhaps better put as affiliation, points to the need for a suspension of the ultimate value of the affirmation of identity and to the need of altericity or the suspension of the universal through the preferential option for the damnes. Affiliation, which is defined by the Chicana theorist Chela Sandoval as "attraction, combination, and relation carved out of and in spite of difference," goes together here with non-indifference and responsibility, both of which presuppose listening to the cry of the condemned." To be sure, both listening and responsible action are only possible through embodiment. Action is in this sense no longer defined by the hand-that-takes but rather by receptive generosity and what Sandoval has aptly rendered as de-colonial love. In short, in new de-colonial sciences the search for truth and knowledge, the accomplishment of liberty and equality, and the satisfaction of demands for the recognition of identity respond to something greater than themselves: to the humanizing task of building a world in which genuine ethical relations become the norm and not the exception--the very subversion of the paradigm of war. The creation of the world of the You needs to be mediated by the exercise of critique. Philosophy is called to identify and denounce the moments in which structures of meaning respond to the interest of Being and betray the for-the-Other of signification. Philosophy performs a reduction of what has been "said" by showing the many ways in which the said turns against, rather than in favor of, the flourishing of ethics in the interhuman realm. Philosophy is called to show when certain formations of meaning create or are complicit with a context marked by the relation between a master and a slave. This relation is sometimes located at a basic intersubjective level, but its most frightful expression appears when it defines general modes of perception and behavior in communities, social bodies, and growing civilizations. At its highest level, the relation between master and slave takes on the control and division of the whole world and becomes empire. The critique of the imperial formation of the said evokes the de-colonial reduction. The de-colonial reduction attempts to bring out the pathologies of existence in contexts marked by the geopolitical extension of the relation between master and slave. By introducing coloniality as an axis of reflection in the examination of the lived worlds of communities, the de-colonial reduction makes clear how different sorts of pathologies can be traced back to the betrayal of the human in an imperial project of existence. The de-colonial reduction also opens up the mental space to enquire imaginatively into new possibilities of existence and the subversive power of loving or alterical acts. The critique of the imperial expression of the said or de-colonial reduction is ultimately performed by both the philosopher and the activist. The destabilization of the imperial order of things appears in thought as well as in praxis. At the end, Don Quixote, in his eccentric reflections, was a sort of philosopher himself. So was Frantz Fanon, who, with a rifle in one hand and a pen in the other, fought against dehumanizing and condescending ways of being and behaving. Expressions of anger and practices of violence represent the last recourse of the "damned." But activism has manifold ways to express itself, and to express itself continually it must, if it ever wants to see some change in the way that institutions work and in the manner in which we behave toward each other. The de-colonial reduction is, therefore, performed in praxis and not only in theory. It can become then both a way of thinking and a way of life. In both of these ways, the de-colonial reduction gives expression to a peculiar utopian ideal: the end of empire and of imperial man. It becomes a constant alert against the temptation of ever trying to form "a community of masters." This alert and the related utopian ideal pose a challenge to Western civilization. Vanquishing Eurocentrism in its many forms becomes one of the most urgent tasks of the de-colonial reduction. Unfortunately, neither philosophers of the right nor critics of the left yet perceive the importance of this task. On the one hand we find Eurocentric discussions of liberalism, communitarianism, or cosmopolitanism; on the other hand we find equally Eurocentric discussions of radical political action. We even find either open retrievals of Eurocentrism or Eurocentric critiques of Eurocentrism. These philosophers and critics have not realized that the first and most basic gesture of the critique of Eurocentrism lies in listening to what the peoples on the periphery have to say about truth, justice, love, critique, community life, and so forth. They have to hear the people on the periphery, learn from them, and fight with them for the attainment of a condition in which such people are able to reproduce their lives and contribute fully in discussions about the future of humanity. This does not mean that the learning process is unidirectional. This is rather a matter of enacting a receptive de-colonial attitude by virtue of which true communication can be achieved. The de-colonial attitude highlights the epistemic priority of the problem of the color line, which, following Lewis Gordon, could be understood as the line between the allegedly normative and abnormal identities and forms of life. The de-colonial attitude also gives a preferential option for the condemned of the earth, meaning that it takes centrally the questions, concerns, and proposals for de-colonization that emerge in the underside of the modern world. This does not mean that European responses must be rejected in toto since they have contributed and still contribute much to critical thinking; rather, they need to be opened up radically and transformed in light of the challenges posed by colonization and the paradigm of war. Resistance to such opening, dialogue, and transformation is a sad testimony to the persistence of Eurocentrism and the master morality of imperial man. De-colonization is waiting to occur not only in regard to material and cultural levels but also vis-a-vis epistemic levels.

#### The role of the ballot is to decolonize epistemology --- this turns and is mutually exclusive to the aff.

Mignolo 09 (Professor of Literature in Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies) Walter, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture, & Society, 161-163, NDW //DDI13

ONCE UPON a time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated from the known and untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which people are racially ranked and regions are racially configured. From a detached and neutral point of observation (that Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007) describes as the hubris of the zero point), the knowing subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for them. Today that assumption is no longer tenable, although there are still many believers. At stake is indeed the question of racism and epistemology (Chukwudi Eze, 1997; Mignolo, forthcoming). And once upon a time scholars assumed that if you ‘come’ from Latin America you have to ‘talk about’ Latin America; that in such a case you have to be a token of your culture. Such expectation will not arise if the author ‘comes’ from Germany, France, England or the US. In such cases it is not assumed that you have to be talking about your culture but can function as a theoretically minded person. As we know: the first world has knowledge, the third world has culture; Native Americans have wisdom, Anglo Americans have science. The need for political and epistemic delinking here comes to the fore, as well as decolonializing and decolonial knowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies. Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics of knowing. Who and when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather than produced, like cars or cell phones)? Asking these questions means to shift the attention from the enunciated to the enunciation. And by so doing, turning Descartes’s dictum inside out: rather than assuming that thinking comes before being, one assumes instead that it is a racially marked body in a geo-historical marked space that feels the urge or get the call to speak, to articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living organisms ‘human’ beings. By setting the scenario in terms of geo- and body-politics I am starting and departing from already familiar notions of ‘situated knowledges’. Sure, all knowledges are situated and every knowledge is constructed. But that is just the beginning. The question is: who, when, why is constructing knowledges (Mignolo, 1999, 2005 [1995])? Why did eurocentered epistemology conceal its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations and succeed in creating the idea of universal knowledge as if the knowing subjects were also universal? This illusion is pervasive today in the social sciences, the humanities, the natural sciences and the professional schools. Epistemic disobedience means to delink from the illusion of the zero point epistemology. The shift I am indicating is the anchor (constructed of course, located of course, not just anchored by nature or by God) of the argument that follows. It is the beginning of any epistemic decolonial de-linking with all its historical, political and ethical consequences. Why? Because geo-historical and bio-graphic loci of enunciation have been located by and through the making and transformation of the colonial matrix of power: a racial system of social classification that invented Occidentalism (e.g. Indias Occidentales), that created the conditions for Orientalism; distinguished the South of Europe from its center (Hegel) and, on that long history, remapped the world as first, second and third during the Cold War. Places of nonthought (of myth, non-western religions, folklore, underdevelopment involving regions and people) today have been waking up from the long process of westernization. The anthropos inhabiting non-European places discovered that s/he had been invented, as anthropos, by a locus of enunciations self-defined as humanitas. Now, there are currently two kinds or directions advanced by the former anthropos who are no longer claiming recognition by or inclusion in the humanitas, but engaging in epistemic disobedience and de-linking from the magic of the Western idea of modernity, ideals of humanity and promises of economic growth and financial prosperity (Wall Street dixit). One direction unfolds within the globalization of a type of economy that in both liberal and Marxist vocabulary is defined as ‘capitalism’. One of the strongest advocates of this is the Singaporean scholar, intellectual and politician Kishore Mahbubani, to which I will return later. One of his earlier book titles carries the unmistakable and irreverent message: Can Asians Think?: Understanding the Divide between East and West (2001). Following Mahbubani’s own terminology, this direction could be identified as de-westernization. Dewesternization means, within a capitalist economy, that the rules of the game and the shots are no longer called by Western players and institutions. The seventh Doha round is a signal example of de-westernizing options. The second direction is being advanced by what I describe as the decolonial option. The decolonial option is the singular connector of a diversity of decolonials. The decolonial paths have one thing in common: the colonial wound, the fact that regions and people around the world have been classified as underdeveloped economically and mentally. Racism not only affects people but also regions or, better yet, the conjunction of natural resources needed by humanitas in places inhabited by anthropos. De - colonial options have one aspect in common with de-westernizing arguments: the definitive rejection of ‘being told’ from the epistemic privileges of the zero point what ‘we’ are, what our ranking is in relation to the ideal of humanitas and what we have to do to be recognized as such. However, decolonial and de-westernizing options diverge in one crucial and in - disputable point: while the latter do not question the ‘civilization of death’ hidden under the rhetoric of modernization and prosperity, of the improvement of modern institutions (e.g. liberal democracy and an economy propelled by the principle of growth and prosperity), decolonial options start from the principle that the regeneration of life shall prevail over primacy of the production and reproduction of goods at the cost of life (life in general and of humanitas and anthropos alike!). I illustrate this direction, below, commenting on Partha Chatterjee’s re-orienting ‘eurocentered modernity’ toward the future in which ‘our modernity’ (in India, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in South America, briefly, in all regions of the world upon which eurocentered modernity was either imposed or ‘adopted’ by local actors assimilating to local histories inventing and enacting global designs) becomes the statement of interconnected dispersal in which decolonial futures are being played out. Last but not least, my argument doesn’t claim originality (‘originality’ is one of the basic expectations of modern control of subjectivity) but aims to make a contribution to growing processes of decoloniality around the world. My humble claim is that geo- and body-politics of knowledge has been hidden from the self-serving interests of Western epistemology and that a task of decolonial thinking is the unveiling of epistemic silences of Western epistemology and affirming the epistemic rights of the racially devalued, and decolonial options to allow the silences to build arguments to confront those who take ‘originality’ as the ultimate criterion for the final judgment.

### Contention 1

#### No Error replication

**Harvey ’97** (Frank, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – Dalhousie U., “The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War”, p. 138-139)

Linguistic Relativism. One approach of postmodernists is to point to the complex nature of language and meaning as a critique of positiv¬ism; this critique is, in turn, relevant to the overwhelming amount of work in IR (Phillips 1977; Giddens 1979; George and Campbell 1990). Although a comprehensive assessment of the linguistic relativism debate is beyond the scope of this project, it is possible to address the underlying philosophical argument, which is fairly straightforward. Building on the work of Wittgenstein (1968), the linguistic variant of the criticism contends that any attempt to reduce everyday terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning to be found in social activity" (George and Campbell 1990, 273). By implication, a concept, term, word, or symbol cannot correspond "to some ... externally derived foundation or object" and ulti¬mately is context-dependent. Similarly, Phillips argues that the validity of theory cannot be determined because "There is no standard or objective reality (always fixed, never changing) against which to com¬pare a universe of discourse ... nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be used to justify ... a statement's truth or falsity" (1977, 273). Of course, it is not entirely clear how this "multiplicity of meaning" is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality. An important distinction must be drawn between the assertion that these discrepancies might have a significant impact on scientific theorizing and the assertion that they do have such an effect. In most cases, errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and ultimately have very little impact on the generalizability of social theories. There are numerous words, symbols, concepts, and ideas, for example, that are commonly understood, regardless of other linguistic variations, but the implications of this standardized concep¬tual framework are frequently overlooked and ignored in the post¬modern critique. In any case, it is contingent upon the theorist to specify the precise meaning of any variable or symbol that is central to a theory. Although definitions may vary — possibly partly, but not entirely, as a conse¬quence of language — scholars nevertheless are more likely than not to understand and agree on the underlying meaning of most words, symbols and phrases. The point is that theorists generally do have a common starting point and often suspend, at least temporarily, coun¬terproductive debates over meaning in order to shift emphasis towards the strength and logical consistency of the theory itself, a more important issue that has nothing to do with language. Evaluating the internal consistency of the central assumptions and propositions of a theory, that is, criticising from within, is likely to be more conducive to theoretical progress than the alternative, which is to reject the idea of theory building entirely. Finally, the lack of purity and precision, another consequence of linguistic relativism, does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. The study of international relations may not be exact, given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others, but precision is a practical research problem, not an insurmountable barrier to progress. In fact, most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. Clearly, **our understanding of the causes of international conflict** — and most notably war — **has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations** (Vasquez 1987, 1993). The alternative approach, implicit in much of the postmodern literature, is to fully accept the inadequacy of positivism, throw one's hands up in failure, given the complexity of the subject, and repudiate the entire enterprise. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy.

#### Double bind --- either

#### A) Your militarism impacts are inevitable

**Dorfman 12**, Assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs

(Zach What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>)

The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million. U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage. The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

#### Or B) there is no risk of endless warfare

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

# 2nc

### 2nc overview

### 2nc link wall

#### 2. Terrorist Exclusion --- the 1AC advocates refining the terror list to make it a more effective tool of isolation and exclusion. Their 1AC Jackson evidence says that the problem with the terror list is that it is both over- and under-inclusive --- implying that the terror list would be fine so long as it were accurate. The plan is a tool to IMPROVE our ability to dominate the “real” terrorists. This is classic coloniality – gestures of inclusion are used to double down on exclusionary violence.

Mignolo 2000 [Walter, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University Local Histories/Global Designs, 175-178] //DDI13

In 1971 Dussel, starting and departing from Levinas, conceived totality as composed by "the same" and "the other." Describing the totality formed by "the same" and "the other," Dussel called it "the Same." And we'll see soon why. Outside totality was the domain of "the other." The difference in Spanish was rendered between *lo otro,* which is the complementary class of ihe same" and *el otro* relegated to the domain exterior to the system. I am tempted to translate this view today as a "interior" and "exterior" subalternilics. Socially and ontologically, the exteriority is the domain of the homeless, unemployed, illegal aliens cast out from education, from the economy, and the laws that regulate the system. Metaphysically, "the other" is—from the perspective of the totality and the "same"—the unthinkable that Dussel urges us to think. "Philosophy in Latin America, and this is a first conclusion, should begin by making a critique of Totality as totality" (1975, 21). this conception is useful in the sense that the difference between interior and exterior subalternities is framed in legal and economic terms. Thus, it is indeed a class difference. However, the difference is not justified in terms of class but in terms of ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and sometimes ity (i.e., if the nationality in question happens to be "against" democracy and Western nationalistic ideals). Nobody is cast out because he or she is poor. He or she becomes poor because he or she has been cast out. On the other hand, this difference allows us to understand that gender, ethnic and sexual differences could be absorbed by the system and placed in the sphere of interior subalternity. This is visible today in the United States as far asAfro-Americans, women, Hispanics, and queers (although with sensible differences between these groups) are becoming accepted within the system as *lo otro,* complementary of the totality controlled by "the same." Beyond the fact lhat Dussel used some questionable metaphors based on the structure of the Christian family to make his argument, he also untie 1 lined very important historical dimensions: 1. A critique of modern epistemology or modern thinking *(el pensiii moderno);* 2. The coloniality of power introduced by Christianity in the "dis covery" of America and in what Dussel ( 1 9 9 6 ; 1998a) most recent I\ identified as the modern world system. Dussel placed what is known today as Latin America in the exteriority of "the other" upon which tin modern world system constituted itself; 3. Claims that looking at Latin America as "the olher" explain the successive constructions of exteriorities in the colonial histories of the modern world system and, consequently, the similarity (beyond obvl ous differences in their local histories) among regions of the "Third World" (e.g., the Arabic world, black Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and China); 4. Consequently, and beyond the details of the geopolitical relations and the fact that these observations were made during the crucial year, of the cold war, the geopolitical conclusions were that Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union constitute "the geopolitical same" while the rest constitute "the geopolitical other." At this point the lot .1 tion of Latin America as "the other" is ambiguous. Dussel's argument tries to show the uniqueness of Latin America as the only geopolitic al and subaltern unit—with the exception of Cuba—that cannot entertain a dialogue with Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union at the same time, while all the other geopolitical units can, but this line ol argumentation is unconvincing. However, I would like to retain from this issue Dussel's confrontation with Marxism in the modern world system as well as in Latin America. His conceptualization of Totality in historical and socioeconomic and legit terms led Dussel, a serious scholar of Marx (Dussel 1985; 1988; 1990) n I a critic of Marx and of Marxism in Latin America. Marx's unquestionable contribution to the analysis of the functioning of capitalist economy cannot not be confused with Marx's sightless when it came to the location ni The other" *(el otro*) and the exteriority of the system. That is, Marx, •n • Hiding to Dussel, only thinks in terms of totality ("the same" and "the i a In i," which is the working class) but is less aware of alterity, the exteriority ni ihe system. Hence, Marx's thinking on these issues is located within modern epistemology and ontology. In his critical analysis about modern episteItmlogy *(el pensar moderno),* that term to which he attributed the conceptual .iiion of totality I described earlier, Dussel summarizes ideas well known (nilny, although less familiar in 1971. Modern thought since Descartes, Dus• I argues, presupposed an ontology of totality that, for reasons that are quite linple, had to include a metaphysic of alterity as negativity. The reason, he Hrues, can be found in the ontological break of modern thought with its i iieck legacies. The modern concept of being is secular and is therefore built upon a negation of the other, which is identified with the God of Christian totality. The same, now, is the ego, an ego without God. Totality, according In Dussel, is no longer a *fysis* (in the sense of ancient Greek philosophy) hill *ego;* there is no longer a physic but an *egotic* totality. To this egotic Inundation of totality corresponds the Kantian left *denke* and Marx's *Ich arliflle.* Hegel, for whom Knowledge and Totality are the Absolute, installed lilmsclf, according to Dussel, at the crux of modern thought. Neither Nietzsche nor Marx could escape from the modern paradigm. Nietzsche's mystical experience, in the Alps, where he discovered that "All is one," napped him in the idea of an eternal return to "the Same," a Totality moved li\ "a will to power," to which Dussel opposes the "dominated will." He • i includes by saying that: A esta modernidad pertenece tanto el capitalismo liberal, y por lo tanto tambien el dependiente latinoamericano, como tambien el marxismo ortodoxo. Esto me parece fundamental en este momento presente de America Latina. Puedo decir t|iie no son *radicalmente* opuestos siquiera, sino que son ontologicamente "lo Mismo." Esto, evidentemente, no lo aceptarian con ninguna facilidad muchos marxistas del tipo althuseriano, por ejemplo. (Dussel 1975, 21) in this modernity belongs both liberal capitalism, and consequently Latin American dependent capitalism, as well as orthodox Marxism. This premise is basic for me, at this particular junction of Latin American history. 1 can say that liberal capitalism and Marxism are not *radically* opposed but that they are indeed ontologically "the Same." This conclusion may not be easily accepted, I believe, by Althusserian-Marxists. Dusscl's view of the inadequacy of Marxism for Latin America is grounded in Ins analysis of modern thought and the place of Marxism in this paradigm— mainly, in the fact that modern thought was oblivious of colonialiiy. I mil America" in this case could be read as the unthinkable of modernity, ni , iJ only thinkable within modernity, but not as coloniality. In his own won I El marxismo es incompatible ontologicamente no solo con la tradicion Lalliin americana sino con la meta-fisica de la Alteridad. No es puramente una inn i pretacion econoniico socio-politica, es tambien una ontologfa, y, como tal, n intrinsicamente incompatible con una metafisica de la Alteridad. No es incom patible, en cambio, lo que podria llamarse *socialismo;* esto ya es otra cuestion (Dussel 1975, 41) Marxism is ontologically incompatible not only with the Latin American tradt tion but also with the metaphysic of alterity. Marxism is not only an economic and sociopolitic interpretation but, as such, is intrinsically incompatible with the metaphysic of Alterity. It is not incompatible, on the contrary, with something that could be called *socialism.* This is a different story. Here, Dussel puts his finger on an issue and a possible debate within the I. It itself. First of all, Dussel's view of Marxism as ingrained in "modern thinking" (el *pensar moderno*) and not alien to it, has been restated by others molt recently (Immanuel Wallerstein recently did so in his discussions ol tin geoculture of the modern world system [1991a, 8 4 - 9 7 ] ) . But that is not all and perhaps not the most interesting aspect of Dussel's position. Of more interest for the argument of this chapter is the fact that il coincides wilh tin positions defended by Aymara intellectual and activist Fausto Reinaga. What are the grounds from which Dussel is defending this argument? My sense is that it has to do with his view of the deopolitics of Christianity. Let me explain.

#### 3) Methodology --- The 1AC tethers emancipatory philosophical movements to pragmatism and policy relevance --- this aspiration for universal truth and commonality puts the cart before the horse, foreclosing the possibility for decolonial contestation of actually existing Western hierarchies --- this is a specific link to their Stehn evidence.

Margutti 13 [Paulo, professor in the Department of Philosophy at Jesuit School of Philosophy and Theology in Belo Horizonte, “Pragmatism and Decolonial Thinking: an Analysis of Dewey’s Ethnocentrism”, http://www.pucsp.br/pragmatismo/dowloads/lectures\_papers/margutti-14thimppaper.pdf, p. 18-21]

The above discussion does not exhaust the answer to our second question. We still ………the philosophical universal.

### at: alt

### at: empathic solidarity

#### Your feel-good epistemology is a placebo.

Maldonado-Torres ‘2 (Nelson, Associate Professor of Comparative Literature at Rutgers; “Postimperial Reflections on Crisis, Knowledge, and Utopia,” *Review* XXV, 3, p227-315) //DDI13

\*gender modified

It must be clear now that my critique of Mignolo does not merge from a particular interest in defending the European from n unjustifiable dismissal of his epistemic capacities, as my critique f the "epistemic segregation" implied in the notion of colonial difference would appear. If the notion of colonial difference is suspect to me it is not so much because it leaves the European aside, but because it still carries the idea of there being a European in the first place. This idea reduces the effectiveness of a transgresstopic critique, which requires a questioning of any such isolated point of view and demands nothing less than a radical transformation in the European's way to see ~~himself~~ [themselves] and the world. The costs of the post­occidental radical turn announced and partly enacted by the notion of "colonial difference" may be simply too high, since its articulation entails the survival and legitimization of a now local but still ethnocentric epistemological conception (the European). I suggest, in line with the concept of transgresstopic critical hermeneutics announced here, that the focus of attention be expanded from the space of the colonized and the effects of the coloniality of power in that space, to the colonial and imperial forces that sustain a regime of power in which both colonized and colonizer come into being. This partly includes a more decisive emphasis on the "colonial" side of the equation represented by the notion of "colonial difference." It is true that the forms of knowledge that appear in colonized context are as much a result as a response to the colonial and imperial powers that I refer to here. Yet it is still necessary to make explicit the critical implications of the uncovering of coloniality as a constitutive force in the formation of subjects and life-worlds. These are, among others, (1) that the European is as much a product of coloni­ality as the colonized-to which one may add that the European monological attitude hides a more profound "internal" pluritopicality (see Estermann, 1998: 22), (2) that the European must aspire to articulate a postimperial point of view, and (3) that the articulation of such a point of view implies a radical questioning of the mode of living and knowing implicated in the very idea of an "European." In short, the European cannot simply continue existing as we have known ~~him~~ [them].18 The relativization of his point of view is only the negative side of a most difficult task at "unlearning imperial privileged" and at fomenting postimperial forms of life. Perhaps the first step in this direction consists in hearing what the colonized subaltern has to say about colonization and about the privileged imperial subject, the European. Unlearning imperial privilege, however, **cannot simply consist in adopting a generous epistemological attitude toward the subaltern**. This unlearning is to be the place where ethics and knowledge meet since the promotion of a postimperial form of life and the possibility of generating an authentic "dialogue" with the subaltern cannot dispense with a praxis that aims to bring about the collapse of the segregating walls created by imperial violence. All those sublime thoughts that most of us share, those institutions so sacred to the West, and those nationalist projects that take their force from the backs of segregated populations concen­ trated in ghettos or living in reservations need to be revaluated as part of this unlearning. Nothing less than a moratorium on the West is required for this unlearning to take place. Unexpected narratives may then begin to emerge in different locations-as they have merged from peripheral subjectivities. Insofar as these narratives and subsequent macronarratives are informed by interactions with subjects from different places they will not respond uniquely to the horizons provided by spatial location. Transgresstopical in character, breaking the horizon of the local and overcoming the logic of the imperial reproduction (or rather, elimination) of the species, these macronarratives announce a postcolonial future and the possibility of forging a postoccidental world. This is to be achieved both by ceasing to take the West as the global, and by attempting to articu­ late and promote the idea of a postimperial West. This is the chal­ lenge of will and imagination for the West at the beginnings of the twenty-first century. The only "burden" of European Man and his American successor is to deal with themselves.

### at: prag/Stehn

#### 2. DA to your methodology --- transforming institutions fails.

Grosfoguel 11, Ramón. "Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality." TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1, no. 1 (2011): 21-22 //DDI13

In the present world-system, a peripheral nation-state may experience transformations in its form of incorporation to the capitalist world-economy, a minority of which might even move to a semi-peripheral position. However, to break with, or transform, the whole system from a nation-state level is completely beyond their range of possibilities (Wallerstein, 1992a; 1992b). Therefore, a global problem cannot have a national solution. This is not to deny the importance of political interventions at the nation-state level. The point here is not to reify the nation-state and to understand the limits of political interventions at this level for the long-term transformation of a system that operates at a world-scale. The nation-state, although still an important institution of Historical Capitalism, is a limited but important space for radical political and social transformations. Collective agencies in the periphery need a global scope in order to make an effective political intervention in the capitalist world-system. Social struggles below and above the nation-state are strategic spaces of political intervention that are frequently ignored when the focus of the movements privileges the nation-state. Social movements’ local and global connections are crucial for effective political interventions. The dependentistas overlooked this due, in part, to their tendency to privilege the nation-state as the unit of analysis and to the economic reductionist emphasis of their approaches. This had terrible political consequences for the Latin American left and the credibility of the dependentista political project.

### at: perm parenthisis and mutuality

#### a8. We do not provide a roadmap as objective but rather opens up a space for different epistemologies to arise --- its not about saying one way of knowing is best but rather that some crowd out other ways of knowing and delinking is a prerequisite to finding a good epistemology ---

Walter Mignolo, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature at Duke University, ’11 [The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options, p. xxvii-xxviii] //DDI13

Decoloniality means decolonial options confronting and delinking from coloniality, or the colonial matrix of power. While the decolonial option is not proposed as the option, it is an option claiming its legitimacy among existing ones in the sphere of the political, in the same way that Christianity, Marxism, or liberalism house many options under the same umbrella (I will come back to this point in more detail in chapter 1). And it is an option claiming its legitimacy among existing academic projects, such as postcoloniality, ethnic studies, gender studies, the social sciences and the humanities, and the professional schools; but also it is an option among options offered by macro-narratives such as Christianity, liberalism, and Marxism. '!he decolonial option also doesn't mean "decolonialmission(s)." Missions implied projects of conversion of achieving and end programmed in the blueprint. Options are the antithesis of missions. We--decolonial intellectuals--are not missionaries going to the field to convert and promote our form of salvation. What we-and by "we" I refer here to all those who share decolonial projects-put on the table is an option to be embraced by all those who find in the option(s) a response to his or her concern and who will actively engage, politically and epistcmically, to advance proj- ects of epistemic and subjective decolonization and in building communal futures. That is why my argument is built on "options" and not on "alternatives." If you look for alternatives you accept a point of reference instead of a set of existing options among which the decolonial enters claiming its legitimacy to sit at the table when global futures are being discussed. For that reason, the first dccolonial step is delinking from coloniality and not looking for alternative modernities but for alternatives to modernity. Not only arc postcoloniality and decoloniality two different options within the same set (like it happens within Christianity, Marxism, lslamism, Buddhism, and the like, where the names encompass unity in diversity), having modern/ colonial histories and experiences in common, but both are options offered in diverse universes of discourse and sensing. Postcoloniality, f()r example, emerged as an option to poststructuralism and postmodernity, but decolo- niality emerged as an option to the rhetoric of modernity and to the com- bined rhetoric of "development and modernization" (from 1950 to 1970), re-converted to "globalism" during the Reagan years. Decoloniality came to light also as an option to the discourse of decolonization during the Cold War and as a critical option in relation to Marxist-dialectical materialism.

#### 9. We don’t presuppose a universal truth but rather open up spaces for new types of thought that have been occluded by coloniality.

Mignolo (Professor of Literature in Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies) 2012

Walter, “Epistemic Disobedience and the Decolonial Option: A Manifesto,” Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 45-46, NDW //DDI13

But the basic formulation of decolonial delinking (e.g., desprendimiento) was advanced by Aníbal Quijano in his ground-breaking article “Colonialidad y modernidad/racionalidad” (1991) [Coloniality and modernity/rationality]. The argument was that, on the one hand, an analytic of the limits of Eurocentrism (as a hegemonic structure of knowledge and beliefs) is needed. But that analytic was considered necessary rather than sufficient. It was necessary, Quijano asserted, “desprenderse de las vinculaciones de la racionalidad-modernidad con la colonialidad, en primer término, y en definitiva con todo poder no constituido en la decisión libre de gentes libres” [“It is necessary to extricate oneself from the linkages between rationality/modernity and coloniality, first of all, and definitely from all power which is not constituted by free decisions made by free people”].4 “Desprenderse” means epistemic de-linking or, in other words, epistemic disobedience. Epistemic disobedience leads us to decolonial options as a set of projects that have in common the effects experienced by all the inhabitants of the globe that were at the receiving end of global designs to colonize the economy (appropriation of land and natural resources), authority (management by the Monarch, the State, or the Church), and police and military enforcement (coloniality of power), to colonize knowledges (languages, categories of thoughts, belief systems, etc.) and beings (subjectivity). “Delinking” is then necessary because there is no way out of the coloniality of power from within Western (Greek and Latin) categories of thought. Consequently, de-linking implies epistemic disobedience rather than the constant search for “newness” (e.g., as if Michel Foucault’s concept of racism and power were “better” or more “appropriate” because they are “newer”—that is, post-modern—within the chronological history or archaeology of European ideas). Epistemic disobedience takes us to a different place, to a different “beginning” (not in Greece, but in the responses to the “conquest and colonization” of America and the massive trade of enslaved Africans), to spatial sites of struggles and building rather than to a new temporality within the same space (from Greece, to Rome, to Paris, to London, to Washington DC). I will explore the opening up of these spaces—the spatial paradigmatic breaks of epistemic disobedience—in Waman Puma de Ayala and Ottabah Cugoano. The basic argument (almost a syllogism) that I will develop here is the following: if coloniality is constitutive of modernity since the salvationist rhetoric of modernity presupposes the oppressive and condemnatory logic of coloniality (from there come the damnés of Fanon), then this oppressive logic produces an energy of discontent, of distrust, of release within those who react against imperial violence. This energy is translated into decolonial projects that, as a last resort, are also constitutive of modernity. Modernity is a three-headed hydra, even though it only reveals one head: the rhetoric of salvation and progress. Coloniality, one of whose facets is poverty and the propagation of AIDS in Africa, does not appear in the rhetoric of modernity as its necessary counterpart, but rather as something that emanates from it. For example, the Millennium Plan of the United Nations headed by Kofi Anan, and the Earth Institute at Columbia University headed by Jeffrey Sachs, work in collaboration to end poverty (as the title of Sach’s book announces).5 But, while they question the unfortunate consequences of modernity, never for a moment is the ideology of modernity or the black pits that hide its rhetoric ever questioned: the consequences of the very nature of the capitalist economy—by which such ideology is supported—in its various facets since the mercantilism of the sixteenth century, free trade of the following centuries, the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, and the technological revolution of the twentieth century. On the other hand, despite all the debate in the media about the war against terrorism, on one side, and all types of uprisings, of protests and social movements, it is never suggested that the logic of coloniality that hides beneath the rhetoric of modernity necessarily generates the irreducible energy of humiliated, vilified, forgotten, or marginalized human beings. Decoloniality is therefore the energy that does not allow the operation of the logic of coloniality nor believes the fairy tales of the rhetoric of modernity. Therefore, decoloniality has a varied range of manifestations—some undesirable, such as those that Washington today describes as “terrorists”—and decolonial thinking is, then, thinking that de-links and opens (de-linking and opening in the title come from here) to the possibilities hidden (colonized and discredited, such as the traditional, barbarian, primitive, mystic, etc.) by the modern rationality that is mounted and enclosed by categories of Greek, Latin, and the six modern imperial European languages.

# 1nr

### 2nc ov

#### b)Even if removing sanctions is topical, at WORST it has to RESULT in ECONOMIC engagement, removing them from the state sponsor of terror list results in MILTIARY engagement

**Department of State No Date** (US department of state, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm)//HA

Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are four countries designated under these authorities: Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria. Country Designation Date Cuba March 1, 1982 Iran January 19, 1984 Sudan August 12, 1993 Syria December 29, 1979 For more details about State Sponsors of Terrorism, see "Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism" in Country Reports on Terrorism.

#### Military transactions are distinct from economic ones

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: **DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS** Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa **MILITARY CONTACTS** Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing **ECONOMIC CONTACTS** Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants **CULTURAL CONTACTS** Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### C) reflects consensus of the lit, which is the most predictable metric for evaluating what’s topical

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” [http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf](http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http:/polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf)

An examination of the scholarly literature on economic engagement as an instrument of statecraft reveals a striking pattern. Albert Hirschman’s 1945 study, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, is widely acknowledged today as a starting point for analysis (Hirschman, 1945/1980). Hirschman argued that the conscious cultivation of asymmetrical interdependence, if conducted strategically by the government of a powerful state, would lead weaker states to reorient not only their economies but also their foreign policies to the preferences of the stronger state. He developed a systematic framework for analysis and applied it to the trading and political relationships between

### at: w/m -> trade

#### That’s a limits disaster --- everything the US does effects the international economy

**Derrick, 98** - LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT R. DERRICK United States Army (“ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA342695>)

In addition to the agencies that administer the programs listed in figure 3, the State Department proclaims that "...protecting national interests and advancing US goals involve virtually every agency of the government...."16 US governmental agencies with international reach directly engage as a part of their daily routines. Agencies that deal strictly with domestic policy indirectly engage through the effect their actions have on US markets and thus world markets. For example the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, Transportation, and Energy, have both domestic and international responsibilities. From trade status to travel status, from immigration rules to export of tools, from training flights to basing rights, US agencies directly and indirectly engage through hundreds of programs. US governmental agencies that inadvertently operate at crosspurposes, through misunderstanding or ignorance, must ultimately be coordinated at some point. Since there is no single director below the President to coordinate the US engagement activities of the three elements of national power, it becomes the responsibility of the regional CINCs and Ambassadors.

#### They are mixing burdens --- trade expansion has to be the action of the plan, not the result of it

**Celik, 11 –** master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows, “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations”.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that “the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.”

#### The consensus of the literature is SO heavily in our favor JOKE?

**Sheen, 2** – associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University (Seongho, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, “US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its Implication for Sunshine Policy” <http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho_sheen.pdf>) footnote 22

22 Speaking of different strategies of economic statecraft, Michael Mastanduno distinguishes: “Whereas economic warfare and a strategic embargo aim to weaken the capabilities (economic and/or military) of a target state and rely on either comprehensive or selective trade denial, linkage strategies are characterized by a reliance on some degree of trade expansion as a means to influence the behavior or policies of a target government.” In particular, he calls the unconditional positive engagement policy as a “structural linkage” strategy. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 53–58.

#### This means trade has to be the mechanism of the plan – engagement is a deliberate expansion of economic ties, not an effect

**KARAKASIS, 8** – MA in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at Instabul Bilgi University (VASILEIOS, “THE IMPACT OF EUROPEANIZATION ON GREECE’S ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY TOWARDS TURKEY”, <http://www.academia.edu/667112/The_Impact_of_Europeanization_on_Greeces_Engagement_Strategy_towards_Turkey>)

This policy is accompanied by an economic pillar. By economic engagement what can be implied is a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with the adversary aiming to change its attitude and improve the bilateral relations. This pillar relies on increasing levels of trade and investments aiming to moderate the target’s interests’ conceptions by shifting incentives and building networks of interdependence.48 Economic interdependence is able to operate as transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the latter. It can generate and establish vested interests in the context of target society and government undermining old values of military status and territorial acquisition. The beneficiaries of this interdependence become addicted to it and protect their interests by putting pressure on the government to accommodate the source of independence.49 Internationalist elites committed to economic openness and international stability might marginalize nationalist elites which are wedded to the threat or use of force. Regardless whether the society of targeted society constitutes a pluralist democracy or not, interests tied to international economy become a critical part of the electorate to whom political elites must respond.50

### Case list

#### They still get a Cuba aff --- they can normalize trade relations

**French 9** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

the path to “normal” trade relations If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade actually occurs depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

#### **They literally get any aff that is direct expansion of trade ties with a country --- that’s big enough**

**Ilias, 13** - Specialist in International Trade and Finance for the Congressional Research Service (Shayerah, “U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Export Promotion: Overview and Issues for Congress” CRS Report for Congress, 1/31, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41495.pdf>)

Federal government agencies perform a wide variety of functions that contribute to export promotion, including providing information, counseling, and export assistance services; funding feasibility studies; financing and insuring U.S. trade; conducting government-to-government advocacy; and negotiating new trade agreements and enforcing existing ones.

Approximately 20 federal government agencies are involved in supporting U.S. exports directly or indirectly. Nine key agencies with programs or activity directly related to export promotion are the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Commerce, Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Small Business Administration (SBA), Department of State, Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and Department of the Treasury. The USDA has the largest level of export promotion funding, followed by Commerce. Some agencies charge fees for their services.

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#### Energy affs are topical and awesome.

Farnsworth, 13 --- vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society (4/11/2013, Eric, “ENERGY SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

AND THE CARIBBEAN, HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-FarnsworthE-20130411.pdf>, JMP)

More broadly, the United States has a strategic interest in working with willing nations in the hemisphere to develop their own energy resources effectively, while promoting models that reduce the negative if unintended consequences ofregional energy development, including a lack of transparencyand official corruption, the distorting impact of consumption subsidies, an over-reliance on a single commodity or sector, environmental concerns, and a concentration of wealth and political power around the sector. In order to develop their respective industries, nations need U.S. technology, management expertise, and investment dollars. They need our education systemto develop their engineers and seismologists, they need help to understand regulatory, tax, and policy models that work, they need to be exposed to best practices in environmental mitigation, and they need our technical assistance to improve the investment climate and the rule of law.